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MicroSkills Reference

Webhook Signature Checker

network.validate_webhook_signature

ProductionBounded custom (Class B)Deterministicstrictfastv1.0.0
No network

Overview

You send the raw webhook body, the provider's signature header, your shared secret, and a reference time — and we tell you whether the signature matches and whether the timestamp is still fresh. We support common provider schemes (Stripe, GitHub, Shopify, Slack, Svix, and a generic HMAC mode). An invalid signature returns valid=false with a reason — not a platform error. Your secret never appears in the response. We perform no network calls. Don't use this to fetch URLs or verify a bare HMAC without a provider header format.

Webhook authentication fails quietly when the signed-payload construction or timestamp check is wrong. You shouldn't have to reimplement every provider's header format.

Reliability

Fully deterministic: you supply referenceTime, we never read the server clock. A bad signature is an answer, not an error, so it comes back as valid=false with a reason. The MAC comparison is constant-time, and your secret appears nowhere in the response. What valid=true does and does not tell you: it means the body you handed us was signed with the secret you handed us and the timestamp sat inside your tolerance. It says nothing about replay — we keep no history, so de-duplicating delivery ids is still yours to do — and it only covers the exact bytes you passed, so read the raw body before any JSON parser reformats it. Failures, none retryable without a change: WEBHOOK_SCHEME_UNSUPPORTED means scheme is not one of the six we implement, so pick one or use security.verify_hmac for a bare MAC. WEBHOOK_SECRET_INVALID means the secret was empty or could not be decoded for that scheme, so check you copied the whole signing secret. WEBHOOK_TEMPLATE_INVALID means we could not build a signed payload from your template, so give generic_hmac a template that says what the provider signs. HMAC_ALGORITHM_UNSUPPORTED means allowedAlgorithms named something other than HMAC-SHA256, HMAC-SHA384 or HMAC-SHA512, so choose one of those three.

Context footprint

Returns a structured verdict without echoing the body or secret. A successful call costs 1 execution credit.

When to use it

When you already hold the raw body and signature header from an inbound webhook and need a deterministic yes/no verdict.

When you need to fetch a URL, call a provider API, or verify a bare HMAC without a provider header format.

Scope

Note
Verify a provider webhook signature header against your secret — verification only, no outbound HTTP.

Non-goals

  • Does not open sockets or make HTTP requests
  • Does not store, retrieve, or rotate secrets
  • Does not manage idempotency keys or replay caches
  • Does not contact provider APIs
  • Does not support schemes outside the declared list

Properties

IdempotentRetry safeStreaming supportedFile input supportedRequires external service

Capabilities

hashingvalidation

Cost & billing

Flat rate per invocation

MetercallsBillable onsuccessCost per call1 credit

File handling

Accepts file_refProduces file_refMax input1 MB

How we handle your data

Sensitive processing
What this means

This skill is designed to detect, mask, redact, validate, or otherwise process sensitive data.

Squillify guarantees
  • Runs inside Squillify
  • This skill runs inside Squillify.
  • Payloads are not sent to an external service by this skill.
  • Squillify does not permanently store submitted payloads.
  • Telemetry records metadata only, not submitted content.
  • Submitted payloads are not used for training.
  • Submitted payloads are not reviewed by humans.
  • Targets sensitive data
  • The response does not contain submitted content.
Your responsibility

Squillify does not determine whether submitted content is sensitive. Your application is responsible for deciding what data it is allowed to submit. Your application is responsible for securing the response.

Read the Microskill Data Handling Policy

Input schema

FieldTypeRequiredDescription
schemestringYesNamed provider scheme that selects the header grammar and signed-payload layout.
bodystringYesRaw request body the signature covers, 0 to the published character cap.
signatureHeaderstringYesProvider signature header value.
secretstringYesShared signing secret, never echoed.
referenceTimestringYesISO-8601 instant used for timestamp freshness; the server clock is not read.
signedPayloadTemplatestringNoExact signed-payload layout with {body}, {timestamp} and {id}; omit it for named provider schemes.
optionsobjectNoClosed fine-tuning for tolerance, algorithms, generic encoding and timestamp override; omit the whole object for 300s tolerance and HMAC-SHA256 hex.

Output schema

FieldTypeRequiredDescription
validbooleanYesTrue only when the MAC matches and the timestamp is fresh.
schemestringYesProvider scheme the signature was checked under, lower-cased.
algorithmstringYesHMAC algorithm actually used.
signatureCountintegerYesHow many candidate signatures were parsed from the header.
matchedSignatureIndexintegerNoZero-based index of the first matching candidate; omit it when none matched.
reasonstringYesWhy this verdict was produced.
timestampobjectYesClosed timestamp facts: present false alone when the scheme carries none, otherwise value, ageSeconds and withinTolerance.
findingsarrayYesReserved advisory array that is always empty because the verdict lives in valid and reason.
_metaobjectNoAlways present on success, with signedPayloadBytes naming the UTF-8 length of the exact MAC input.

API contract

POST /v1/execute
curl
curl -sS -X POST "$BASE/v1/execute" -H "Authorization: Bearer $KEY" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"skillKey":"network.validate_webhook_signature","input":{"scheme":"github_sha256","body":"{}","signatureHeader":"sha256=abc","secret":"s","referenceTime":"2026-03-25T00:00:00Z"}}'
Integrations
TypeScript SDK
import { Squillify } from "@squillify/sdk";

const sq = new Squillify({ apiKey: process.env.SQUILLIFY_API_KEY });

const { output } = await sq.execute("network.validate_webhook_signature", {"referenceTime":"2026-03-25T00:00:05Z","signatureHeader":"t=1774396800,v1=8d062b986658ceb065e80ea46c6432744f86163bdc9b3afb11cfa8929c2011a4","body":"{\"id\":\"evt_1\",\"type\":\"charge.succeeded\"}","secret":"whsec_dGVzdF9zZWNyZXRfa2V5XzEyMzQ1Njc4OTAxMjM0NTY=","scheme":"stripe_v1"});

Errors

CodeHTTPRetryableDescription
VALIDATION_ERROR400NoThe request payload failed schema validation.
UNAUTHORIZED401NoMissing or invalid API key.
SKILL_NOT_ACCESSIBLE403NoThe API key is not granted access to this skill.
SKILL_NOT_AVAILABLE_FOR_PLAN403NoThis skill is not included in your current plan.
PLAN_ELIGIBILITY_UNAVAILABLE503YesPlan eligibility could not be decided. Retry after backoff.
SKILL_NOT_FOUND404NoThe requested skill or version does not exist.
TENANT_RATE_LIMITED429YesRequest rate limit exceeded. Retry after backoff.
QUOTA_EXCEEDED429YesPlan quota exhausted. Retryable once the quota period resets.
EXECUTION_TIMEOUT504YesExecution exceeded the allowed time budget.
WEBHOOK_SCHEME_UNSUPPORTED400NoThe skill does not support the requested variant.
WEBHOOK_SECRET_INVALID400NoThe request payload failed this skill's input validation.
WEBHOOK_TEMPLATE_INVALID400NoThe request payload failed this skill's input validation.
HMAC_ALGORITHM_UNSUPPORTED400NoThe skill does not support the requested variant.

Other limits

LimitValue
Recommended inline bytes32 KiB

Limitations

  • Does not open sockets or make HTTP requests
  • Does not store, retrieve, or rotate secrets
  • Does not manage idempotency keys or replay caches
  • Does not contact provider APIs
  • Does not support schemes outside the declared list
  • Generating an HMAC over an arbitrary message without a provider header format (use security.verify_hmac)
  • Fetching a webhook URL or calling a provider API

How to call

POST /v1/execute (requires authentication)

Request bodyjson
{
  "skillKey": "network.validate_webhook_signature",
  "input": {
    "referenceTime": "2026-03-25T00:00:05Z",
    "signatureHeader": "t=1774396800,v1=8d062b986658ceb065e80ea46c6432744f86163bdc9b3afb11cfa8929c2011a4",
    "body": "{\"id\":\"evt_1\",\"type\":\"charge.succeeded\"}",
    "secret": "whsec_dGVzdF9zZWNyZXRfa2V5XzEyMzQ1Njc4OTAxMjM0NTY=",
    "scheme": "stripe_v1"
  }
}

Examples

Stripe charge webhook — signature and timestamp both check out

Inputjson
{
  "referenceTime": "2026-03-25T00:00:05Z",
  "signatureHeader": "t=1774396800,v1=8d062b986658ceb065e80ea46c6432744f86163bdc9b3afb11cfa8929c2011a4",
  "body": "{\"id\":\"evt_1\",\"type\":\"charge.succeeded\"}",
  "secret": "whsec_dGVzdF9zZWNyZXRfa2V5XzEyMzQ1Njc4OTAxMjM0NTY=",
  "scheme": "stripe_v1"
}
Expected outputjson
{
  "findings": [],
  "timestamp": {
    "ageSeconds": 5,
    "value": "2026-03-25T00:00:00Z",
    "withinTolerance": true,
    "present": true
  },
  "algorithm": "HMAC-SHA256",
  "valid": true,
  "signatureCount": 1,
  "_meta": {
    "signedPayloadBytes": 51
  },
  "matchedSignatureIndex": 0,
  "scheme": "stripe_v1",
  "reason": "MATCH"
}

MAC matches but the delivery is too old — valid=false, reason TIMESTAMP_STALE

Inputjson
{
  "referenceTime": "2026-03-25T01:00:00Z",
  "signatureHeader": "t=1774396800,v1=8d062b986658ceb065e80ea46c6432744f86163bdc9b3afb11cfa8929c2011a4",
  "body": "{\"id\":\"evt_1\",\"type\":\"charge.succeeded\"}",
  "secret": "whsec_dGVzdF9zZWNyZXRfa2V5XzEyMzQ1Njc4OTAxMjM0NTY=",
  "scheme": "stripe_v1"
}
Expected outputjson
{
  "findings": [],
  "timestamp": {
    "ageSeconds": 3600,
    "value": "2026-03-25T00:00:00Z",
    "withinTolerance": false,
    "present": true
  },
  "algorithm": "HMAC-SHA256",
  "valid": false,
  "signatureCount": 1,
  "_meta": {
    "signedPayloadBytes": 51
  },
  "matchedSignatureIndex": 0,
  "scheme": "stripe_v1",
  "reason": "TIMESTAMP_STALE"
}

Body was tampered with — valid=false even when the header looks plausible

Inputjson
{
  "referenceTime": "2026-03-25T00:00:05Z",
  "signatureHeader": "t=1774396800,v1=8d062b986658ceb065e80ea46c6432744f86163bdc9b3afb11cfa8929c2011a4",
  "body": "{\"id\":\"evt_2\"}",
  "secret": "whsec_dGVzdF9zZWNyZXRfa2V5XzEyMzQ1Njc4OTAxMjM0NTY=",
  "scheme": "stripe_v1"
}
Expected outputjson
{
  "_meta": {
    "signedPayloadBytes": 25
  },
  "findings": [],
  "valid": false,
  "algorithm": "HMAC-SHA256",
  "reason": "SIGNATURE_MISMATCH",
  "scheme": "stripe_v1",
  "timestamp": {
    "ageSeconds": 5,
    "value": "2026-03-25T00:00:00Z",
    "withinTolerance": true,
    "present": true
  },
  "signatureCount": 1
}
  • Authenticate Stripe, GitHub, Shopify, Slack, or Svix webhook deliveries you already received
  • Reject replayed deliveries whose timestamp falls outside your tolerance window

Avoid for

  • Generating an HMAC over an arbitrary message without a provider header format (use security.verify_hmac)
  • Fetching a webhook URL or calling a provider API

Composable with

Safety & privacy

  • Runs without calling any external service.
  • Your payloads are never stored permanently.
  • Telemetry captures metadata only — never your payload contents.
  • We never train models on your payloads.
  • No human reviews your payloads.

Tags

securitynetworksignaturevalidationwebhook